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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Brandon Leigh Day appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon
the jury verdict finding him guilty of robbery. On appeal, Day challenges (1) the
district court's failure to order an "additional" competency evaluation; (2) certain
statements made by the prosecutor during closing argument to which he did not
object at trial; and (3) his sentence.

Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
On August 2, 2010, a "masked guy" entered Russell Todd Johnson's One
Idaho Insurance office, "pulled out this big knife" and demanded "all the money."
(PH Tr., p.3, Ls.12-14; p.4, Ls.2-13. 1) Mr. Johnson complied, giving the robber
$290.00, which consisted of "two hundreds, a fifty, and two twenties." (PH Tr.,
p.4, L 13; p.6, Ls.6-11.) The robber then fled on foot. (PH Tr., p. 7, Ls.2-5.) Mr.
Johnson grabbed the cordless phone from his desk to call 911 and followed the
robber outside. (PH Tr., p.8, Ls.14-23.) Mr. Johnson, who was unable to contact
911 because his phone could not connect, stopped Charles Hooker, who was in
a nearby car. (PH Tr., p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.11.) Mr. Johnson asked Mr. Hooker to
call 911.

(PH Tr., p.9, Ls.11-12.)

Mr. Hooker called 911 and followed the

individual Mr. Johnson identified as the robber. (PH Tr., p.9, Ls.14-21; Tr., p.229,
Ls.11-17.) Mr. Hooker watched the robber run into an apartment building. (Tr.,
p.232, Ls.22-24.) Neither Mr. Johnson nor Mr. Hooker saw anyone else on the
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Mr. Johnson's preliminary hearing testimony was read into evidence at trial in
lieu of live testimony. (Tr., p.69, Ls.1-6; pp.221-227.)
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street during the time Mr. Johnson and Mr. Hooker followed the suspect into the
apartment building. (PH Tr., p.10, Ls.18-20; Tr., p.230, L.24 - p.231, L.4.)
Mr. Johnson described the suspect as having "a shirt thing over his head
with slits cut in it like a mask" and he was wearing tennis shoes, a gray t-shirt,
and shorts. (PH Tr., p.7, Ls.9-12.) Mr. Johnson was unable to see the robber's
face because the robber was wearing a mask, but Mr. Johnson said the robber
was "about five ten, skinnier guy." (PH Tr., p.20, Ls.8-10, 20-21.) Mr. Hooker
described the suspect as wearing "gym shorts" and "something on his head like a
bandana or an article of clothing of some sort." (Tr., p.238, L.4-14.)
Law enforcement arrived within minutes of the robber entering the
apartment building.

(Tr., p.241, Ls.18-23.)

The officers quickly set up a

perimeter around the building and other officers entered to look for the suspect.
(Tr., p.256, Ls.6-21; p.258, L.16 - p.259, L.1; p.287, Ls.12-17.) Within a few
minutes of being inside, Officer Garren Kelly saw a "male without a T-shirt," later
identified as Day, "coming down from the second floor."

(Tr., p.260, L.20 -

p.262, L.10.) Officer Kelly detained Day and noted he was "very sweaty" and
had a "shirt wrapped around his head." (Tr., p.261, Ls.3-9.) At that time, Day
was wearing jeans with the zipper undone and no shirt. (Tr., p.261, Ls.4-5, 1718.)

Officer Jared Mendenhall, however, found the following items "stuffed

behind some conduit above [an] electrical box" on the basement floor of the
building: "a pair of dark blue gym shorts, a gray T-shirt, a pair of white tennis
shoes, and what was a sleeve off of another gray T-shirt that had two slits cut in
it and a knot tied in the top of it." (Tr., p.338, Ls.1-7.) The t-shirt and mask were
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"visibly damp like they had been sweated in" and the clothes smelled like "they
had recently been work and sweated in." (Tr., p.344, Ls.17-20.)
When officers brought Day outside where Mr. Johnson was, Mr. Johnson
said that he thought Day looked "bigger" or "more built" than the guy who robbed
him, but Day was the same "body height." (PH Tr., p.23, L.20 - p.24, L.19.) Mr.
Johnson also noted that Day was dressed differently than the robber. (PH Tr.,
p.24, Ls.1-8.) Mr. Hooker noted at trial that the individual he followed down the
street was "average size and weight" and the individual he saw in handcuffs at
the apartment building was also "average size and weight." (Tr., p.248, Ls.8-16.)
While the police were still on scene, Mr. Johnson went to a rock wall Day
ran past while fleeing because he noticed that after Day left that area, he was no
longer carrying "whatever he was carrying before when he was running." (PH
Tr., p.43, L. 16 - p.44, L.8.) There, Mr. Johnson found a garbage can with a "gray
shirt thing" and the sheath that held the knife Day used to threaten him. (PH Tr.,
p.44, Ls.12-15, 23-25.) Mr. Johnson picked up the garbage can and took it "to
the scene" and gave it to law enforcement who recovered the knife, which was
also described as a "sword" and a t-shirt with a sleeve cut-off. (PH Tr., p.44,
Ls.16-17; p.45, Ls.18-24; p.292, L.17 -

p.293, L.19.)

discovered rubber gloves in Day's pocket, but no money.

Officer Kelly also
(Tr., p.270, L.20 -

p.271, L.5.)
The state charged Day with robbery and a deadly weapon enhancement.
(R., pp.9-10, 22-23.) At his arraignment, Day advised the court he wished to
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proceed pro se and Trent Grant from the public defender's office agreed to act as
standby counsel. (Tr., p.9, L.19 - p.10, L.8; p.12, L. 12 - p.14, L.14.)
Prior to trial, standby counsel filed a motion for a psychological evaluation
pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-210, -211, and -212, which the district court granted. (R.,
pp.27-30.)

Day, however, refused to participate in the evaluation.

(Tr., p.20,

Ls.10-12; letter from Psychological Assessment Specialists dated September 13,
2010.)

The court advised Day that his case could not proceed without the

evaluation, assured him that the evaluation would not be used as evidence
against him, and asked Day how he wished to proceed. (Tr., p.20, L.10 - p.21,
L.7; p.23, Ls.4-9.) Day responded that he did not "want to talk to any privateinterest State person" (Tr., p.23, Ls.10-11 ), but indicated he would be willing to
participate in an evaluation (Tr., p.27, Ls.10-12).

Consequently, the court

entered a second order for an evaluation. (R., pp.39-42.) The second evaluator
determined Day was competent to stand trial.

(See Tr., p.30, Ls.18-22;

Psychological Assessment dated October 8, 2010.)
After the evaluation, Day sent a document to the court, which the court
interpreted as an objection to the evaluator's report. (See Tr., p.29, Ls.9-12.) As
a result, the court scheduled a hearing at which it asked Day whether he wanted
to present testimony on the nature of his disagreement or whether he wanted to
have the court appoint a different evaluator. (Tr., p.30, L.23 - p.31, L.5; p.31,
Ls.21-24; p.33, Ls.2-6.) Day answered: "Well, I won't agree to be evaluated by
anybody. . . . Whatever you see fit I'll go with." (Tr., p.33, Ls.7-11.) Day also
told the court he wanted someone to assist him in his case, specifically stating he
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would "greatly appreciate Mr. Grant's help." (Tr., p.36, L.5 - p.37, L.10.) The
court, therefore, agreed to have Mr. Grant represent Day with the understanding
that Day could later elect to again proceed pro se. 2 (Tr., p.37, L.20 - p.38, L.24.)
When asked for his position on the competency evaluation, Mr. Grant advised
the court he had read the competency evaluation, did not "particularly disagree
with the report as a whole," and would be "willing to abide by the
recommendation" that Day was "competent to stand trial." (Tr., p.39, Ls.12-20.)
The court then found: "As it stands right now, the Court does find the defendant
competent to stand trial." (Tr., p.39, L.24 - p.40, L.1.)
At the next status conference, Mr. Grant told the court he had an
opportunity to discuss the competency evaluation with Day and indicated Day
was concerned that the prior evaluation was not done in accordance with the
statute and that Day was interested in having another evaluation in which he
would be willing to participate. (Tr., p.50, L.24 - p.51, L.1 0; p.52, Ls.2-6; see
also Tr., p.55, Ls.2-14.) Day disagreed with Mr. Grant but, at the same time, said
he would be "just fine with talking" to "state hospital." (Tr., p.52, Ls.7-13.) In
response, the district court told Day he would order another evaluation by a
different evaluator if Day so desired. (Tr., p.5, L.24 - p.56, L.2; p.57, Ls.8-10;
p.58, Ls.22-25.)
evaluation.

The court asked Day more than once if he wanted another

(Tr., p.57, Ls.8-1 0; p.60, Ls.17-20.)

Day said he did not want

another evaluation "in the Bonneville County Jail," said he did not "need to"
2

Mr. Grant's status changed several more times before trial, but Day ultimately
elected to proceed to trial represented by Mr. Grant, with the court allowing Day
the ability to intervene as he deemed appropriate. (Tr., p.51, Ls.13-15; p.61,
Ls.7-8; p.62, L.21-p.64, L.1; p.103, Ls.17-18.)
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request a second evaluator, and told the court, "let's go to triaL" (Tr., p.60, L.17 p.61, L.6.) The court then scheduled the case for trial. (Tr., p.61, Ls.7-8.)
Part of the evidence introduced at trial was a redacted letter confiscated
after Day's arrest. (See generally Tr., pp.371-395.) The letter was written by Tim
Hudson that included $290 in cash in the exact denominations taken from Mr.
Johnson. (Exhibits 11, 20.) The letter advised the recipient to "keep $90.00" and
"put $200.00 on Brandon Day [sic] books."

(Exhibit 11.)

The evidence

established that, on the date the letter was placed in the mail, Day and Hudson
were in the same dorm at the jail. (See generally Tr., pp.371-395.)
The jury found Day guilty of robbery and the state dismissed the weapon
enhancement.

(R., pp.84-85.) The court imposed a unified 15-year sentence

with five years fixed. (R., pp.113-115.) Day filed a timely notice of appeal. (R.,
pp.117-126.)

6

ISSUES
Day states the issues on appeal as:
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to order
an additional competency evaluation after defense counsel
alerted the district court to its continuing concerns about Mr.
Day's competency?
2. Did the State violate Mr. Day's right to a fair trial by committing
prosecutorial misconduct?
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed, upon
Mr. Day, a unified sentence of fifteen years, with five years
fixed, following his conviction for robbery?
(Appellant's Brief, p.8.}

The state rephrases the issues on appeal as:
1.
Has Day failed to establish the district court abused its discretion in
declining to order a third competency evaluation given Day's refusal to participate
in the first evaluation, the second evaluator's finding that Day was competent,
and Day's indication that he would not participate in a third evaluation if ordered?
2.
Has Day failed to establish he is entitled to relief based upon the
prosecutor's closing arguments on grounds to which he did not object?
3.
Given the nature of the offense and Day's lengthy criminal history, has
Day failed to establish an abuse of discretion in the imposition of a unified 15year sentence with five years fixed entered upon the jury verdict finding Day
guilty of robbery?

7

ARGUMENT
I.
Day Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Discretion In Declining
To Order An "Additional" Competency Evaluation

A

Introduction
Day asserts the district court abused its discretion by failing to order an

"additional competency evaluation prior to trial" in light of "defense counsel's
request for an evaluation, the prior failure to participate in competency
evaluations, [his] mental health history, and present behavior." (Appellant's Brief,
p.9.) Day refused to participate in the first court-ordered competency evaluation,
was found competent in the second evaluation, indicated he would not participate
in a third evaluation if ordered, and advised the court he would prefer to proceed
to trial. Based on these circumstances, the district court correctly concluded a
third evaluation was not required. Day has failed to establish otherwise.

B.

Standard Of Review
The decision whether to order a psychological evaluation to determine a

defendant's competence to stand trial is ordinarily reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314, ---, 271 P.3d 712, 723 (2012). On
appeal, the Court "examine[s] whether there was sufficient, competent, even if
conflicting, evidence to support the district court's determination of competence."
State v. Hawkins, 148 Idaho 774, 777, 229 P.3d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 2009).
Unless the district court's finding is clearly erroneous, the appellate court will
affirm. l!;l
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C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Declining To Order An
"Additional" Competency Evaluation
If there is a reason to doubt a defendant's competency, the trial court

"must order a 'qualified psychiatrist or licensed psychologist to examine and
report upon the mental condition of the defendant to assist counsel with defense
or understand the proceedings."

Hanson, 152 Idaho at ---, 271 P.3d at 723

(quoting J.C.§ 18-211(1)). The test for determining a defendant's competence to
stand trial is whether he "has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a
rational, as well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him."

kl

(citations and quotations omitted). "There are 'no fixed or immutable signs which
invariably indicate the need for further inquiry to determine fitness to proceed."'

kl

(quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975)).

Although a

defendant's attorney's input on the need for a competency evaluation is relevant,
it "certainly is not determinative." Hanson, 152 Idaho at ---, 271 P.3d at 723
(citations and quotations omitted). Moreover, "[t]he mere fact that [a defendant]
did not heed his counsel's advice and was uncooperative or that his conduct on
the stand would have more likely hurt than help his case, does not render him
incompetent to stand trial." State v. Longoria, 133 Idaho 819, 823, 992 P.2d
1219, 1223 (Ct. App. 1999).

"[WJhere the court reasonably considers both

prongs of the test, its decision to deny an attorney's request for a competency
evaluation is not an abuse of discretion." Hanson, 152 Idaho at---, 271 P.3d at
724. Applying the correct legal standards to the evidence before the district court
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shows the court had no reason to doubt Day's competency to proceed and did
not abuse its discretion by failing to order an "additional" evaluation.
Prior to trial, counsel for Day filed a motion for a competency evaluation,
which the district court granted. (R., pp.27-28, 30.) Day, however, refused to
cooperate in that evaluation.

(Tr., p.20, Ls.10-12; letter from Psychological

Assessment Specialists dated September 13, 2010.) The court held a status
conference to inquire about Day's refusal to cooperate. (Tr., p.20, L.10 - p.21,
L.7; p.27, Ls.10-12.) Day indicated he would be interested in talking to someone
at the Department of Health and Welfare if the purpose would be to allow him to
prepare to be competent to represent himself. (Tr., p.21, Ls.18-23; p.22 Ls.2-4.)
The prosecutor responded:
The State feels, just based on the letters and statements by
Mr. Day, that he may be competent under 18-211 as far as the
ability to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and
the ability to assist in his defense. However, based on his letters
and his statements here, it appears that there are other issues that
are involved that may or may not go to competency.
It appears that Mr. Day is asking the Court to appoint
someone to provide him a legal education; and, of course, that's
not possible. We as lawyers go to school for three, four years of
law school before we can have proper training to become a lawyer.
And so that's not something, if that's what he's asking, that would
be available.
And I guess the Court has made it clear to him that the
evaluation is only to determine whether he's competent to proceed
with a plea agreement or with trial or whatever the case may be. It
has nothing to do with delving into any evidence in the case. In
fact, it would not in any way ever be used against him. And I hope
I've addressed what I think Mr. Day is saying. I don't know that I
have.
But it would be the State's preference that he go through
with the evaluation so at least it makes this Court comfortable with
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whether he is, in fact, competent to proceed under the rules that
are set forth in 18-211 and 18-212.
(Tr., p.24, L.3 - p.25, L.5.)
At the conclusion of the status conference, Day indicated he would be
willing to participate in an evaluation, stating: "So at this time I would like to just
move forward with the blessing of the State hospital if possible."
Ls.10-12.)

(Tr., p.27,

The court, therefore, ordered a second evaluation, which was

conducted by a different psychologist.
Psychological

Assessment

Specialists

(R., pp.39, 41-42; compare letter from

dated

September

13,

2010

with

Psychological Assessment dated 10/8/10 ("Psychological Assessment").)
Dr. John Landers, who conducted the second evaluation, made the
following observations with respect to Day's mental status and behavior:
The defendant presented in the following manner during
examination. He was adequately groomed in typical inmate attire
and of average build. He was hostile with the examiner and
demonstrated increased eye contact.
During examination he
presented with average psychomotor activity and clear speech.
This is noteworthy as someone experiencing true psychosis is
typically agitated in their psychomotor activity when untreated with
psychotropic medication.
Thought content was illogical and
incoherent at first but became logical, coherent, and goal-directed
when angry. The defendant did not indicate he was experiencing
hallucinations nor did he appear to be responding to internal stimuli
nor experiencing other perceptual disturbances.
His thought
processes were undisturbed and fluent. The defendant's mood
was angry and affect was stable and congruent with mood. Again,
this is noteworthy as mood and affect are often labile and
incongruent during a psychotic episode, indicating disorganization
of thought processes.
During the examination the defendant
demonstrated no cognitive impairment. The defendant's estimated
intellectual functioning is in the average to above average range.
He demonstrated the inability to control impulsive behaviors during
the examination. His insight into his presenting concern is good
though his judgment in pursuing an effective future course of action
is absent. This absence does not appear to be the result of a
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mental incapacity but rather the result of criminal thinking patterns
consistent with antisocial personality disorder with which he has
been diagnosed on several occasions.
(Psychological Assessment, p.2.)
Regarding Day's competency to proceed, Dr. Landers stated:
It is the opinion of this examiner that the defendant does not suffer
from a mental disease or defect, as stated in Idaho Code 18-210
and therefore is fit to proceed. His intellect appears to be quite
sharp and he is quite experienced in the judicial process. Though
this defendant may not demonstrate appropriate courtroom
decorum nor act in a way that would be advisable by his appointed
counsel, it is the opinion of this examiner that apparent deficits are
not the result of a psychiatric illness nor intellectual deficit. Rather,
his behavior is consistent with what would be expected of someone
who is antisocial. Though he may not exercise proper judgment, he
is capable of doing so and does not lack the capacity to make
informed decisions.
(Psychological Assessment, pp.2-3.)

Dr. Landers concluded Day "is fit to

proceed and does not require nor would he benefit from a period of restoration in
a psychiatric facility."

(Id. at p.3.)

Dr. Landers recommended Day's case

proceed "without further delay due to concerns regarding [Day's] mental
condition." (Id.)
Day "objected" to Dr. Landers' report. 3 (See Tr., p.29, Ls.9-11.) Although
the court was not required to order another evaluation, it offered Day the option
of having another evaluation by a different evaluator or, alternatively, the court
3

That Day lodged an objection to Dr. Landers' report with the court is consistent
with his reaction to Dr. Landers when Dr. Landers advised him of his opinion, at
the time of the evaluation, that he was fit to proceed and his belief that Day was
"malinger[ingJ psychiatric illness" as he had done in the past. (Psychological
Assessment, p.2.) Upon Dr. Landers informing Day of this, Day "became angry
and verbally abusive" toward Dr. Landers and "forg[o]t to feign incoherence and
illogical thought processes" "as evidenced by [Day's] exhibiting a quite articulate,
organized, logical, and nuanced verbal attack on this examiner." (Psychological
Assessment, p.2)
12

advised Day that it could hold a hearing if Day wanted to present evidence to
contest Dr. Landers' findings. (Tr., p.31, Ls.1-4.) Day responded: "I won't agree
to be evaluated by anybody." (Tr., p.33, Ls.7-8.) Mr. Grant, who was present at
the hearing on Day's objection to Dr. Landers' report, stated:
I understand the conclusions that were drawn in the report. I don't
know that I agree with them completely, but I don't particularly
disagree with the report as a whole. And I personally would
probably be willing to abide by the recommendations that are made
in there that he's - that [Day's] competent to stand trial and leave it
at that. But I have not specifically discussed those findings with
[Day].
(Tr., p.39, Ls.12-20.)

The court thereafter made a finding that Day was

"competent to stand trial." (Tr., p.39, L24

p.40, L.1.)

Approximately one month later, at the pretrial conference, Mr. Grant
explained that he had a chance to meet with Day regarding the competency
evaluation and that Day "felt like perhaps protocol wasn't followed appropriately."
(Tr., p.50, L.24 - p.51, L.8; see also p.55, Ls.2-14.) Mr. Grant stated "[t]here are
still some additional concerns that I have there" and advised the court that Day
"would be willing to sit down with an evaluator." {Tr., p.51, L.25 - p.52, L.5.)
Again the court offered Day the option of participating in another evaluation with
a different evaluator to get a "second opinion on competency." (Tr., p.55, L.24 p.56, L.2.) Day, however, informed the court he was not going to participate in
another evaluation. (Tr., p.60, L.17 - p.61, L.6.) Accordingly, the court did not
order what would have been a third attempt at an evaluation and the case
proceeded to trial. (See Tr., p.61, Ls.7-10.)
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Day claims the court abused its discretion in failing to order an "additional"
competency evaluation, noting that, "[t]hroughout the pendency of [his] case, [he]
wrote a number of letters to the district court and staff" and argues that, "[w]hile
some of the letters are brief and somewhat intelligible, others are simply
incomprehensible." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) However, mere concerns about the
quality of some of Day's writings or even his mental health do not demonstrate
legal incompetence. See Bassett v. McCarthy, 549 F.2d 616, 619 (9th Cir. 1977)
(citing Drope, 420 U.S. at 171) ("The Court in Drope reminds us that this doubt
relates not to mental illness in general but to the practical aspects of the defense
of the action:

'... the capacity to understand the nature and object of the

proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his
defense ... "').

Rather, competence only requires the ability to consult with

counsel "with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "a rational, as
well as factual, understanding of the proceedings against him." I.C. § 18-211(1).
Not only did Dr. Landers conclude that Day was in fact competent to proceed, the
record is replete with information that Day understood the proceedings and had
the ability to consult with counsel.

(R., pp.32-34 (pro se motions filed by Day

requesting information relevant to his defense; pro se motion to suppress
evidence (exhibit); Tr., p.55, Ls.2-14 (reflecting Day's ability to explain his
concerns regarding the evaluation to counsel); p.60, Ls.5-9 (Day advising the
judge not to ask for Mr. Grant's input when Day was proceeding pro se); p.67,
L.6 - p.68, L.17 (reflecting Day's ability to discuss issues with Mr. Grant); p.71,
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Ls.8-19 (asking the court to allow him to have a "hybrid defense" where he and
Mr. Grant worked as a team).}
In addition, it is notable that when counsel asked the court to order a third
evaluation, he never indicated that Day did not understand the proceedings or
was not able to communicate with him. Rather, Mr. Grant simply indicated that
he had some "concerns," but never expressed what those concerns were. (Tr.,
p.51, L.25 - p.52, L.1.) This was insufficient to compel the court to order yet
another evaluation, especially when Day indicated he would persist in his refusal
to participate. Even Mr. Grant acknowledged that if Day was "not going to be
willing to meet with [an evaluator], that creates an issue." (Tr., p.56, Ls.6-8.)
Day's assertion that the court "should have ordered an additional evaluation"
simply because counsel asked (Appellant's Brief, p.15), is contrary to law.
Hanson, 152 Idaho at---, 271 P.3d at 723.
Moreover, the mere fact that Day was, at times, obstreperous and difficult
to deal with is not the equivalent of incompetent.

See, ~ . United States v.

Landers, 564 F.3d 1217, 1222 (10 th Cir. 2009) {"The fact that other federal
prisoners have made the same statements and exhibited the same obstreperous
behavior supported the district court's conclusion that Landers is an antigovernment protestor rather than mentally incompetent. This context confirmed
that Landers was merely engaged in obstructionism, and that his behavior did not
raise a genuine, reasonable doubt about his competency to stand trial."
(quotations and citations omitted).); United States v. James, 328 F.3d 953, 955
(th Cir. 2003) ('That James was obstreperous likewise does not cast doubt on
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his mental acumen; many a person with no defense would rather play games,
and try to goad the judge into error, than face the music politely."); United States
v. Leggett, 162 F.3d 237, 242 (3 rd Cir. 1998) ("Although he was at times
obstreperous, [Leggett] did demonstrate an ability to serve his own interests
before the court."). Any suggestion by Day to the contrary lacks merit.
Day further argues that his "refusal to participate in the prior evaluations
should not be considered in determining whether a new evaluation should be
ordered, nor should his desire to have an evaluation completed." (Appellant's
Brief, p.15.) Day, however, cites no authority for such a proposition. Contrary to
Day's assertion, his stated intention to refuse to participate in an "additional"
evaluation is highly relevant to his claim that the court was required to order an
evaluation that would serve no purpose - particularly where, as here, the court
had already made a finding of competence based on a prior evaluation. See
Drope, 420 U.S. at 180 (a prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial is
relevant to determining whether further inquiry is required).

The prior finding of

competence also belies Day's claim that "[it] was unknown if [he] was competent
or not." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.)
Based upon the evidence before it regarding Day's ability to assist in his
defense and understand the proceedings, including a recent finding of
competence and Day's representation that he would not participate in another
evaluation even if ordered, the court acted well within its discretion in declining to
order an "additional" competency evaluation. Day's claim to the contrary fails.
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II.
Day Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error With Respect To His Unpreserved
Claims Of Prosecutorial Misconduct

A

Introduction
Day claims the prosecutor's

comments during closing

misconduct amounting to fundamental error.

constituted

(Appellant's Brief, pp.17-23.)

Application of the legal standards governing such claims demonstrates this claim
is without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Generally Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not preserved

for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, _ , 245
P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citations omitted). Where a claim is raised for the first time
on appeal, the appellate court will consider whether the error alleged qualifies as
fundamental error.

C.

~

at 980.

Day Has Failed To Establish Fundamental Error In Relation To The
Prosecutor's Closing Argument
For the first time on appeal, Day claims the prosecutor violated his

Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial and his Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury by making the following statements during his rebuttal closing
argument:
Again, it's not the State that's on trial, it's not me that's on
trial, it's not Detective Barnes that's on trial, it's not Detective Pratt
that's on trial. The defendant is the one on trial, and the focus is on
evidence that you have during the relevant time periods.
The Jury Instruction Number 6 is going to tell you, "Some of
you have probably heard the terms 'circumstantial evidence,' 'direct
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evidence' and 'hearsay evidence.' Do not be concerned with these
terms. You are to consider all the evidence admitted in this trial."
You can't concern yourself with speculative evidence that Mr. Grant
has alluded to. You only consider the evidence that is in the trial.

Again, we have the defense talking about evidence that we
didn't bring in. You're not to consider that. There are various Rules
of Evidence. We're not allowed to bring in hearsay evidence. An
interview with -- testimony about an interview with Tim Hudson
would have been hearsay evidence.

Hearsay evidence is just not something we try to introduce.
Again, you're only to consider the evidence that has been
introduced and not speculate on the evidence that might be out
there and whether the police failed or I failed to bring in certain
evidence just because we failed. There are various reasons, and
the Rules of Evidence are what bind us as to what evidence we can
and cannot bring in.
(Appellant's Brief, pp.19-204 .)
Because Day did not object to any of the prosecutor's statements at trial, 5
in order to prevail on appeal, Day must satisfy the following three-part test
articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho at 209, 226,
245 P.3d 961,978 (2010):
(1) the defendant must demonstrate that one or more of the
defendant's unwaived constitutional rights were violated, (2) the
4

Day's citation to the relevant portion of the transcript is incomplete. He cites
"Tr., p.628, L.11 - p.629, L.6." {Appellant's Brief, p.20.) The portions of the
state's rebuttal closing argument he complains about actually begin on page 625,
·line 25 and continues through to page 629, line 6, although Day leaves out large
sections as indicated by his ellipses.
5

Day correctly notes that trial counsel objected to part of the prosecutor's
argument, but on a different basis than he raises on appeal, thereby conceding
that his misconduct claim should be treated as unpreserved error. (Appellant's
Brief, p.18 n.1.)
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error must be clear or obvious, without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical
decision; and (3) the defendant must demonstrate that the error
affected the defendant's substantial rights meaning (in most
instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings.
Application of the foregoing standard to Day's claim of unpreserved error
demonstrates he has failed to meet his burden of establishing he is entitled to
reversal of his conviction.
Day claims he satisfies the first prong of Perry because, he argues, the
prosecutor's comments violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process
and his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury. 6 (Appellant's Brief, p.22.)
This claim fails because a review of the record and relevant law show that Day's
argument lacks merits and is not based on a complete or accurate portrayal of
the record.
"Generally, both parties are given wide latitude in making their arguments
to the jury and discussing the evidence and inferences to be made therefrom."
State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 720, 215 P.3d 414, 440 (2009) (citations
omitted). Additionally, a prosecutor's comments "must be evaluated in light of
defense conduct and in the context of the entire trial."

lg_,_ (citations and

quotations omitted); see also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179 (1986)

6

Day also alleges a violation of his state constitutional rights. (Appellant's Brief,
p.22.)
Day does not assert the Idaho Constitution provides any greater
protections than the federal constitution in this regard, therefore, he presumably
concedes the state constitution would be construed coextensively with the
federal constitution. See State v. Ross, 129 Idaho 380, 381, 924 P.2d 1224,
1225 (1996) (declining to consider state constitutional claim where appellant "did
not seek a greater scope of protection under the state constitution").
19

("[t]he prosecutors' comments must be evaluated in light of the defense argument
that preceded it"). "[A] criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the
basis of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct
must be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the
prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
Day provides no context for the prosecutor's comments about which he
complains and fails to acknowledge the comments were made in response to
defense counsel's closing argument. (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.17-23.)
Rather, he asks the Court to review the prosecutor's argument in isolation. Such
an analysis is contrary to law because the context is critical to understanding the
statements and to the Court's determination of whether the prosecutor's conduct
affected the fairness of the trial. Severson, supra; Darden, supra; Young, supra.
Defense counsel's theme in closing argument was to compare Day's case
to cases where a defendant was later exonerated by DNA and to apologize to the
jury for the state's failure to provide it with "proper evidence." (See generally Tr.,
pp.602-624.)

Included within counsel's complaints about the lack of "proper

evidence," which he appeared to believe should be limited to "direct evidence"
(Tr., p.608, Ls.6-25), was Mr. Johnson's failure to positively identify Day at the
scene (Tr., p.608, Ls.11-13), the state's inability to obtain adequate fingerprint
evidence on the knife used (Tr., p.608, Ls.14-17), and the lack of DNA evidence
(p.608, Ls.18-25). Defense counsel also argued:
To be fair to you as a jury, I believe that if the State's going
to present circumstantial evidence to you, they need to have
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investigated that evidence well enough to explain all possible
explanations of that evidence beyond a reasonable doubt; and I
don't think they did that here. They didn't take any effort at all.
They just decided Brandon Day was the guy who they were after,
and so they weren't going to do anything. And I'm sure the irony of
this was not lost on you folks, nor is it on me. I think it illustrates
well the deficiencies in the investigation and in presenting this case.
(Tr., p.614, L.22 - p.615, L.8.) Defense counsel further argued:
So they find this money in a letter from an inmate, Tim
Hudson. The letter mentions Brandon Day and putting some of the
money on the books. Do I have an explanation for it that would
have proven [Day's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt? Possibly.
They could have interviewed Tim Hudson. There was testimony. I
asked two different witnesses if Tim Hudson was interviewed. "No,
not to my knowledge." All they had to do -- Tim Hudson's in jail. All
they have to do is go talk to the guy, find out, "Where did you get
the money? Why did you put it in your letter? Why did you ask it to
be put on Brandon Day's books?"
(Tr., p.619, L.18 - p.620, L.5.)
In response to this argument, the prosecutor objected, noting ''There was
no evidence of this. In fact, no questions were asked. It's just way out of line."
(Tr., p.620, Ls.6-9.) Defense counsel responded: "There was testimony that Mr.
Hudson was never interviewed. I can speculate. The State is speculating." (Tr.,
p.620, Ls.10-12.) The prosecutor further asserted "[i]t was hearsay," defense
counsel persisted that he "can speculate," and the court allowed the argument to
continue. (Tr., p.620, Ls.13-18.) Defense counsel continued:
All it would have taken was an interview. Once again, the State's
worried about that because it was something they didn't follow up
on. That's all it would have taken. They could have even gone and
potentially interviewed [Day]. He'd submitted to an interview at the
time they detained him. There was a court order to get his prints;
and the detective testified, at the time that he obtained the prints,
that [Day] was cooperative and gave his full prints.
(Tr., p.620, L.19 - p.621, L.3.)
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Looking at the prosecutor's comments in this case "in context," which
includes defense counsel's arguments preceding them, reveals Day cannot
demonstrate a violation of either his Fourteenth or Sixth 7 Amendment rights.
Rather, the intent of the prosecutor's argument was to directly respond to
defense counsel's claim that the state's evidence was not "proper" and his
assertion that the state could have interviewed Hudson or even Day to find out
the source of the money confiscated in the jail, but failed to do so.

Day's

characterization of the state's argument as "impl[ying] ... that there is other
evidence of [his] guilt that the State [was] unable to present because the judicial
system is prohibiting them from presenting the evidence" and his claim that the
prosecutor "planted an idea in the minds of the jurors that at a minimum there
was an interview with Mr. Hudson that they wanted to present, which must have
been favorable to the State, that they were not allowed to present" (Appellant's
Brief, pp.20-21) is completely disingenuous. It could not have been clearer that
7

Frankly, the state does not entirely understand Day's Sixth Amendment
argument, which is based on an assertion that the prosecutor's comments
"interfered with the jury's ability to make an impartial decision." (Appellant's Brief,
p.22.) That Day had the "right to have the jury be the sole judge of the weight of
the testimony" (Appellant's Brief, p.22 (citations and quotations omitted), was not
impaired by the prosecutor discussing the nature and adequacy of the evidence
during rebuttal. Indeed, that is the point of closing argument. State v. Sheahan,
139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 696 (2003) (the latitude afforded in closing
argument allows the parties to "discuss fully, from their respective standpoints,
the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom" including "a right to
express how, from each party's perspective, the evidence confirms or calls into
doubt the credibility of particular witnesses"); State v. Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445,
450, 816 P.2d 1002, 1007 (Ct. App. 1991) ("The purpose of the prosecutor's
closing argument, not unlike that of the defense in this regard, is to enlighten the
jury and to help the jurors remember and interpret the evidence. Thus, the
prosecutor may discuss the evidence, pointing out discrepancies and conflicts in
the testimony, and argue that the evidence in the record supports and justifies a
conviction.").
22

Hudson was not interviewed, which is the very point defense counsel was trying
to capitalize on in his closing argument.

(Tr., p.619, L.24 - p.620, L.1.) The

prosecutor's rebuttal did not suggest otherwise, much less "plant[ ] an idea in the
minds of the jurors" that Hudson was interviewed and provided information
"favorable to the State." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) The point of the prosecutor's
rebuttal was to explain why, even if Hudson had been interviewed, the state
could not present that testimony because it would have been hearsay, at least if
it had been presented by the interviewer, and to advise the jury that it could not
speculate about evidence that did not exist, which is different than advising the
jury it could not consider the absence of evidence.

In fact, the state

acknowledged "from the beginning that its case was circumstantial and that
certain evidence was not obtained. (Tr., p.216, Ls.12-19; p.600, L.19 - p.602,
L.8; p.629, Ls.7-11.)
Day cannot manufacture a claim of misconduct by providing isolated
portions of the prosecutor's rebuttal closing taken out of context and by
characterizing the prosecutor's comments in a way that is contradicted by the
record. Day's assertion that he satisfied the first prong of Perry fails.
Even if Day could satisfy the first prong of Perry, his misconduct claim fails
under the second and third prongs. The entirety of Day's argument with respect
to the second prong of Perry is that "[t]he error in this case plainly exists from the
record and no additional information is necessary."

(Appellant's Brief, p.22.)

Error is not plain just because Day says so. When the prosecutor's comments
are read in context, the only thing that is plain is that there is no error.
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Further,

Day's naked

assertion that "no additional

information

is

necessary" regarding whether the failure to object was a tactical decision is also
contradicted by the record in that defense counsel clearly did object when he
deemed it appropriate. (Tr., p.627, Ls.9-10; p.628, Ls.18-20.) In fact, defense
counsel made an objection to part of the argument Day complains about on
appeal, but it was a different objection than the one appellate counsel has
chosen to pursue. (Tr., p.627, Ls.18-20.) Just like appellate counsel presumably
made a tactical decision not to pursue other claims of error based on objections
that were made, this Court should also assume a tactical decision by defense
counsel not to object to the prosecutor's rebuttal argument on other grounds.
See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 447, 180 P.3d 476, 486 (2008) ("When
faced with a tactical decision, this Court utilizes the "strong presumption" that the
decision fell within the acceptable range of choices available to trial counsel.").
This is particularly true where, as here, defense could reasonably conclude the
prosecutor's rebuttal was an appropriate response to defense counsel's closing
argument.
Finally, Day has also failed to satisfy the third prong of Perry because he
has not met his burden of demonstrating the argument affected the outcome of
the trial. Although the state's case was circumstantial, the evidence implicating
Day in the robbery was very strong.

Between Mr. Johnson and Mr. Hooker,

someone always had visual contact of Day until he fled into the apartment
building where he was later found sweating "profusely" in a state of undress and
breathing heavily.

(Tr., p.228, L.19 - p.229, L.17; p.241, L.24 - p.242, L.2;
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p.260, L.20 - p.262, L.1 0; p.290, Ls.16-25.) Day's only explanation for why he
was in the apartment building, that he had been jogging and went in to get out of
the sun and smoke a joint, was not credible. (Tr., p.352, Ls.13-18.)
Not only did Day's physical appearance at the time of his apprehension
and his unbelievable explanation regarding the reason he was in the apartment
implicate him in the robbery, law enforcement also found clothes matching the
descriptions provided by Mr. Johnson and Mr. Hooker stashed above the
electrical box inside the apartment building. (Tr., p.338, Ls.1-7.) There was also
testimony that nobody ever saw any other individual either in the area or any
individual exit the apartment building between the time Mr. Hooker saw Day enter
the building and the time he was taken into custody. (Tr., p.241, L.24 - p.242,
L.10.) In fact, the evidence established that the front exit, where Mr. Johnson
and Mr. Hooker waited for law enforcement was the only common entry to the
building and all of the windows appeared undisturbed. (Tr., p.324, L.17 - p.325,
L.3.)
The jury also heard testimony from the other occupants of the apartment
building, all of whom, with the exception of the building manager, were not home
at the time of the incident, and the jury clearly found the testimony of those
witnesses did not create a reasonable doubt as to the evidence of Day's guilt.
(See generally Tr., pp.424-459; 514-531.) Further, although Mr. Johnson was
unable to positively identify him at the scene, there was a reasonable explanation
for his inability to do so - Day had changed clothes from those found on the
electrical box into jeans and no shirt, and he was no longer wearing a mask. (PH
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Tr., p.21, L.25 - p.24, L.24.) And, while there was not a positive fingerprint
identification for Day on the knife sheath, the fingerprint expert testified that Day
could not be excluded as a contributor of one of the prints. (Tr., p.503, Ls.3-9.)
Moreover, Day has failed to show any basis for concluding the jury
disregarded the court's instructions that the prosecutor's arguments did not
constitute evidence. (Tr., p.204, Ls.18-24.)

Because the jury is presumed to

follow the court's instructions and because the evidence of Day's guilt was
substantial, Day has not and cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that
the prosecutor's rebuttal closing affected the outcome of the trial. Thus, even
assuming Day could satisfy the first two prongs of Perry, he is still not entitled to
relief under the third prong.
Because Day has failed to establish the prosecutor's rebuttal closing
argument constituted fundamental error, he has failed to demonstrate his
conviction should be reversed.

111.
Overline Has Failed To Establish The District Court Abused Its Sentencing
Discretion

A

Introduction
Day claims his sentence is excessive and that the district court "failed to

properly consider the mitigating factors that exist in his case." (Appellant's Brief,
p.24.)

More specifically, Day argues the district court "failed to give proper

consideration to his mental health issues" or his "substance abuse problem and
desire to stop using." (Appellant's Brief, pp.24-25.) The record reveals otherwise
and supports the sentence imposed.
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B.

Standard Of Review
When reviewing a defendant's sentence, the appellate court "considers

the entire length of the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard to
determine its reasonableness." State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d
217, 226 (2008).

C.

Day Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion
Day complains his 15-year sentence with five years fixed for robbery

reflects an abuse of discretion because it does not adequately take into account
his mental illness and substance abuse issues.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.24-25.)

Day is incorrect.
The length of a sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard considering the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007) (citing State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 460,
50 P.3d 472, 475 (2002); State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 159 P.3d 838
(2007)).

Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the

burden of demonstrating it is a clear abuse of discretion.

State v. Baker, 136

Idaho 576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho
831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)).

To carry this burden the appellant must show the

sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho
at 577, 38 P.3d at 615.

A sentence is reasonable, however, if it appears

necessary to achieve the primary objective of protecting society or any of the
related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution.
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kl

Prior to sentencing, the district court ordered a mental health evaluation.
(Tr., p.634, Ls.8-10.)

Day refused to participate.

(PSI, p.14; Letter from Tim

Thompson to Judge Tingey dated February 2, 2001 (attached to PSI).)
Nevertheless, the district court expressly acknowledged that Day has some
"mental-health issues" that "require[d] consideration." (Tr. p.647, Ls.18-21.) The
court, however, noted those issues did not "outweigh the need for protection of
society on a serious crime such as this."

(Tr., p.647, Ls.21-23.)

It is also

significant that Day has a lengthy criminal history. (PSI, pp.3-8.)
Further, while Day undoubtedly has a substance abuse issue and claims
to be interested in his treatment, nothing in his behavior indicates he would
actually submit to any intervention.

Regardless, the district court was not

required to place Day's claimed desire for treatment above other sentencing
factors, and the district court adequately considered this aspect of Day's
mitigation by recommending the Therapeutic Community. (Tr., p.648, Ls.9-10.)
That Day believes the "mitigating factors that exist in his case" required a
lesser sentence does not establish an abuse of discretion. Based on the nature
of the offense, the character of the offender, and the objectives of sentencing,
Day has failed to establish the district court abused its sentencing discretion.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Day's judgment of
conviction for robbery.
DATED this 1y!h day of May, 2012
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